Institutional approach to the role of the state in the economy: modern features

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The purpose of this study is to examine the institutional approach to the role of the state in the modern economy. Based on the analysis of various approaches to the study of this phenomenon, the paper formulates the following conclusions. It has been established that the modern stage of economic development is characterized by a revision of the assessment of the role of the state in regulating the market. It is shown that the state at the same time stabilizes the institutional environment and initiates its changes. It is argued that the state form of management of large communities by establishing and changing the rules of economic activity by minimizing transaction costs is the most common today. It is determined that the key results of state regulation of the economy are the support of innovation activity, promotion of scientific and technological progress, creation of conditions conducive to a favorable investment climate, development of various social programs. It is shown that state participation in socio-economic processes should be balanced and effective, and excessive intervention can lead to corruption and restrict competition.

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作者简介

Andrei Kushnir

Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation; A. N. Kosygin Russian State University (Technology. Design. Art); Russian University of Transport (MIIT)

编辑信件的主要联系方式.
Email: Ku7@bk.ru
ORCID iD: 0000-0002-4318-0190
Scopus 作者 ID: 57219595324

Dr. Sci. (Econ.), Professor, Professor, Department of Mass Communication and Media Business; Professor, Department of Economics and Management; Professor of the Department of Customs Law and Organization of Customs Affairs, Law Institute

俄罗斯联邦, Moscow; Moscow; Moscow

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