World esonomy and international relations

The START Treaty-2010 expires in February 2026. This Treaty cannot be extended in its current form. In this regard, the question arises - how the situation will develop in the strategic area, in relations between Russia and the United States, when this Treaty expires? Additional efforts are needed to prevent the process of corrosion in the sphere of strategic stability. It is important to prevent further aggravation of relations not only between nuclear-armed countries, thereby preventing the growing threat of nuclear conflict, but also in the world as a whole. The development of the U.S. national missile defense system under the “Golden Dome” program, work under the “Prompt Global Strike” concept add difficulties to the potential action to bring the international security situation out of the current crisis. The vacuum threatening the world in matters of nuclear arms control can increase negative trends both around and within the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The upcoming NPT Review Conference (2026) will sharply raise the issue of countries’ fulfillment of obligations, primarily under Article VI of this Treaty. Security can be strengthened not only through building up defense capabilities, but also through arms control mechanisms. More international efforts needed to engage the Republic of China, France and Great Britain in multilateral negotiations on nuclear arms control with the participation of Russia and the United States. It is important that the role of Moscow and Washington in this process will be key. At the same time, attention is required to work out the option of Russian-American agreements to replace the START Treaty-2010. Success in the field of nuclear arms control will improve international security of each individual state.

The Trump 2.0 administration pursues the goal of restoring technological, economic, and military superiority to the United States and turning the country into a “manufacturing superpower” through a policy of “reindustrialization from a position of strength”. By implementing a strategy of “deliberate unpredictability” aimed at weakening the positions of US major competitors, Trump constantly demonstrates the “art of the deal” by using the threat of escalating aggression to test the partners’ willingness to negotiate. The “self-inflicted” diplomatic and strategic damage from Washington’s actions is equated by Trump’s opponents with the consequences of COVID-19. The adjustment of the foreign economic policy is carried out on the basis of the absolutization of national interests and ignoring the fundamental postulates of international economic relations. Given the high degree of integration of the United States into the global economy, this can have negative consequences in the form of disruption of production supply chains, rising prices for goods and services, as well as increasing challenges for investors, consumers and businesses. Protectionism hinders the progressive development of world trade and undermines economic cooperation. The countries affected by Trump’s actions are taking retaliatory measures, forming alliances and looking for alternative partners. The tough stance taken by China and some other countries forced Washington to significantly soften its tone and agree to reducing trade barriers. However, regardless of the final outcome of negotiations, higher trade barriers are likely to become the new norm, affecting international trade and encouraging fragmentation.

The article reflects on the political war between the United States and Russia that started in 2022. The author concludes that in 2022-2023, the U.S. was maintaining a reactive and defensive approach to the conflict focused on safeguarding the American population from Russian influence by reactively deconstructing Russia’s narratives and discrediting its information sources. During the same stage of POLWAR, the concept of “domestic public diplomacy” was introduced in the United States in order to legitimize the extension of public diplomacy activities to American citizens as well as foreign audiences. In 2023-2024, the shift from reactive to proactive approach became noticeable with the U.S. building a network of alliances dedicated to countering foreign disinformation. At the same time, the American public diplomacy was being reformed in a way that enhances its effectiveness. Washington has also become more active in generating anti-Russian media-campaigns both with information and cultural instruments, revitalizing the old negative stereotypes about Russia in public opinion and portraying it as a villain in the Ukrainian conflict. To provide this approach, which is a preamble to the switch to offensive tactics, with a theoretical basis the “reputational security” concept has been developed. This concept not only elevates the issues of reputation to the category of national security issues, but also pushes for collective action in terms of protecting one’s own reputation and undermining the reputation of an adversary. Finally, the article analyzes the Trump administration public behavior towards Russia and Ukraine, its approach to public diplomacy institutions and counter-disinformation structures, as well as the general vision of American intelligence experts and the think-tanks loyal to current administration. The official conduct of the U.S. government towards the Russian Federation has become more decent, and the opposite could be said about the behavior towards Ukraine. The Trump administration has eliminated almost all elements of the system of governmental control over the internal information space, and tries to drastically cut the federal spending on public diplomacy. However, according to the publications of the U.S. intelligence and expert communities, the strategic vision of the American establishment has not changed much since 2022. It still clings to the idea of Washington’s global leadership and exceptionalism thus viewing the transformation of the world order as a threat to national interests. Since Russia, in turn, supports the rise of multipolar world order and endorses it with its foreign policies, the core reason for disagreement between two powers remains in place and so the POLWAR is likely to continue.

The profound transformation of the world oil market and its transition to a new development regime has stimulated leading oil producers in OPEC and OPEC+ to take a risky decision and start the accelerated return of significant volumes of oil to the market in 2025. The increase in oil supply is being implemented when the world oil market is oversupplied and against the backdrop of sluggish dynamics of global demand for oil. However, at stake is the configuration of the global oil supply and the position of oil-exporting countries in this supply in the medium and long term. Competition for a place in the global oil supply in the next five to ten years has intensified. The imperative is to ensure a market niche here and now. In just a couple of years, with the slowing growth of global oil demand and the high probability of reaching a peak in global oil demand, changing a country’s position in the global oil supply will require extraordinary efforts and resources. The decision by the OPEC+ eight to increase oil production has opened up the opportunity for Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman to redistribute in their favor those shares of the oil supply that, for various reasons, their partners in OPEC and OPEC+ are losing. In the medium term, the main factor motivating the Gulf countries, which have significant spare oil production capacities, to increase their production in a situation of supply overhang over demand is the challenge from third countries, including OPEC and OPEC+ members. More and more countries globally expand cooperation with leading global oil companies in order to quickly monetize their hydrocarbon reserves. The current situation in the global oil market and in the global economy and politics allows to the OPEC+ eight, or more precisely Saudi Arabia and its allies in the Gulf, to increase production in small steps. Depending on such poorly predictable factors as the dynamics of tight oil production in the US, the state of the oil sector in Iran, which remains in a situation of acute conflict with Israel, the dynamics of production in Iraq, Nigeria, Libya and Angola, as well as the Gulf partners in OPEC+, key OPEC producers are preparing to realize a variety of scenarios for taking a share of the global oil supply through increased investment and have relatively good chances of achieving serious success in the competition for this share.

At the current stage of development of international economic relations, the role of the oceans economy is increasing. The rational use of ocean resources will contribute to the economic development of the countries of the Global South and Russia in the 21st century. However, in the absence of statistics, comparative assessment of the oceans economy’s potential of different countries becomes difficult. Thus, the purpose of this article is to propose a path for such an assessment (for the case of African countries). Based on V. Podinovskiy’s theory of criteria importance and related methods, the authors’ methodology for assessing the Oceans Economy’s Potential (OEP) is proposed. The following OEP indicators are suggested based on the interpretation of the World Bank’s “economy size” indicators: total population; area of the exclusive economic zone and inland waters; and GDP of coastal area (the multiplication product of PPP GDP per capita by the number of people living within 10 km of the ocean coast). In the first stage, the comparison is based on absolute indicators; in the second stage, these were converted into scores. As a result, African countries with the highest OEP are defined: Egypt and South Africa have the highest first-order potential, and Madagascar, Mauritius, Nigeria, Seychelles and Tanzania have the highest second-order potential. The prospects for their cooperation with Russia are assessed. The proposed approach can be used for comparative assessments in different regions of the world. The possibility of using the proposed OEP assessment method for water treatment and purification projects is also noted, but the methodology can be refined for these purposes.

The Benelux countries often used to be called “free rider member states” of NATO both in the analytical literature and by politicians for being less generous defense spenders since early 1990s, and even after all NATO members committed to defense expenditures at 2% GDP. Since the beginning of Russia’s Special Military Operation in Ukraine, however, the Benelux countries’ approaches have changed: the Netherlands’ defense spending reached 2% GDP in 2024, and that of Belgium and Luxembourg has significantly increased and is aiming at reaching 2% in the 2030s. Despite the relatively low level of defense spending, the Benelux provide ample military, financial, and humanitarian aid to Ukraine. The article builds upon research of burden sharing in the alliance, and attempts to outline the factors driving the change in the Benelux countries’ approach to defense cooperation. This change means a step away from the their earlier “geoeconomic” - i. e., economic interests-driven - foreign policy as militarization and degradation of relations with Russia (whose economic impact prior to the recent escalation was not to be overlooked) undermines the three economies. At the same time, “routinization” of the conflict in Ukraine nudges the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg to look for benefits that can be acquired against the current security situation’s backdrop. Greater defense spending and aid to Ukraine, namely, bring the three countries image benefits (assistance to Kiev is aimed to exemplify the countries’ role as reliable partners in NATO and EU) as well as economic gain, i. e., increased opportunities for the defense industries, and greater efficiency of defense investments through joint purchases.

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is ethnopolitical in nature. It has a number of features that distinguish it from other conflicts of a similar type. The distinctive features of the conflict go beyond the contradictions at the level of regional politics. They touch on the deep nature of the Arab-Israeli/Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In addition to the political and economic component of the conflict, other factors such as culture, values of ethnic identity are of great importance. From the very beginning, the Arab-Israeli conflict in Palestine reflected more than just a struggle for the territory. It was a struggle for their history, myths, traditions, and religion, associated with this land by both peoples. The expanding borders of the Israeli state especially after the 1967 war are perceived by Palestinians not only as a confirmation of the seizure of their territories, but also as an assertion of differences and hostility between the two peoples. Due to the ethnic component, it is perceived by the parties not only as a conflict of interests but as a conflict of values. The concept and essence of ethnopolitical conflict and the complexity of its regulation reflect the main characteristics of the Palestinian- Israeli confrontation. These features make the Arab- Israeli conflict the most difficult to manage and to settle. The difficulties of resolution through political compromises create serious problems for the peace process. Despite the ongoing local and international peace efforts, the Jews, Arabs, and other residents of Israel and the Palestinian territories (i. e. the West Bank and Gaza) have endured decades of political, social, and physical upheaval with periodic eruptions of violence.

With the evolution of the global p olitical landscape, various p olitical entities such as countries and international organizations have close and frequent links with epochal significance in international relations. The theoretical applicability to political practice in the emergence of a new world order should be worthy of consideration and research. In addition, as a result of the continuous development of the theories of professional disciplines, the formation of theories with national characteristics is a way to achieve scientific development and theoretical guidance for solving practical problems. The method of the study is research interpretations and works of relevant scholars in the field of international relations formed in contemporary China with “symbiosis” as a philosophical concept and notion. The contents of the study include: 1. Development and debates regarding symbiosis theory; 2. Expansion of symbiosis theory; 3. Reaction of the international academic community to symbiosis theory. The conclusion of the study is that the institutions represented by research institutes and universities contribute to the research level and overall development of China’s international relations theory. Shanghai School researchers have formed academic schools with philosophical theory and through symbiosis and continuously develop them, and use theories and schools that are in line with China’s development situation to promote theoretical innovation and reflection.