卷 2, 编号 1 (2020)

The purpose of this article is to answer the question of how to explain the past. Is there one explanation for the past, or are there many? Explain the past in a causal relationship or without it? What is the reason or causes of historical events? What determines the course of history? Since ancient times, historians have tried to uncover the mechanism of historical development. Determine the determinant-the goal of this development. Different concepts were put forward. The disadvantage of all concepts is monocausality. Their representatives sought to find one goal that defines the development of society. The presence of a large number of determinants-goals caused the presence of different concepts of explaining the past. This article lists these concepts. Do we need these concepts for history? A person's life is determined by a huge set of determinants-goals, external and internal. Any external or internal action or influence of the environment can become a determinant. Human society is a constantly changing organism. History has always been characterized by the action of numerous determinants-factors, a set of cause-and-effect relationships and dependencies, and the ratio of these factors is constantly changing in each specific situation. In history, there is no such goal - factor that would be the only and final basis for its development. History is a product of the interaction of factors, in which cause and effect change places: the effect has the opposite effect on the cause and in turn becomes the cause of something new. Therefore, a multi-factor approach to history, rather than monocausality, is the only rational way to study it. Nowadays, there is more and more talk about the formation of a new scientific paradigm - synergetics. Synergetics-the doctrine of self-organization, the universal laws of evolution of complex dynamic systems that undergo sharp changes in States during periods of instability. Synergetics can also be used in the study of processes occurring in society. Currently, the methodology of a new science is being developed. Time will tell whether she will be able to assert her rights. Perhaps this century will see the emergence of a new meta-science that combines humanitarian and natural science knowledge.

Cinema had been found at the end of the 19th century. The first cinema shows in the Ottoman Empire and the Russian Empire had been held in 1896. Since the beginning of the 20th century, cinema, which was an effective tool in propaganda, had some experiences until the end of the First World War. After the war, developments in international relations brought Turkey and Soviet Russia closer together. Thus, good relations that started in 1919 will have been continued for a long time. During this period, cinema was used by the Bolsheviks in Russia about realizing the objectives of the regime, and this experience affected Turkey. Therefore, one of the issues which mentioned in the relations between the two countries was the cinema. Turkey wanted to benefit from propaganda and indoctrination power of cinema in Atatürk period dominated by the friendly relations between the two countries. This study aims to examine how cinema reflected on the relations between the two countries during the Atatürk period. It has been seen that cinema had an important status in relations between Turkey and Soviet Russia. The interaction on cinema started in the 1920s and continued in the 1930s. Although the cooperation continued between the two countries about the cinema, Turkey had been sensitive to any threat to the regime which could be coming from the Soviet Union in this process.

The Soviet press and documents of the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (Moscow) contain documents on the struggle of the Turkish people for liberation from occupation and their independence. The archive contains numerous translations of European and Turkish newspapers covering military-political events in Turkey, speeches and speeches of public figures, military chronicle. In addition, the Soviet newspapers of that time, Pravda and Izvestia, are of direct interest. In addition, the archives keep the correspondence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR and the Great National Council of Turkey, the Soviet leadership with the diplomatic corps in Angora and the Soviet command about the events in Turkey and Soviet-Turkish relations.

The centenaries of the beginning of the First world war and the Russian revolution of 1917 actualized historiographical reflections on the phenomenon of the Civil war. The article is devoted to identifying the main trends and issues of research on the history of the Civil war based on the analysis of articles published in the 2010s in the historical journals of the Urals and Siberia reviewed by the VAC. The research results published in them allow us to better understand how far historians have advanced in recent years in the direction of creating a "common historiographic space" for the Civil war. Based on the historiographic analysis, three groups of publications are distinguished: historiographic, theoretical and methodological, and concrete historical. The range of issues raised in them is quite extensive. One of the trends of world historiography, researchers call "fitting" the period of the Civil war into the framework of a longer process of the military-revolutionary crisis of 1914-1922, which had a pan-European character and specific Russian features. The directions and results of studying the social mobility of Russian society in the first half of the XX century in historiography are considered. The civil war is comprehended in the Russian civilizational continuum, its connection with the country's modernization process. Various aspects of the social, political, military, and everyday history of the Civil war in the regional dimension are widely presented in the publications. The content of historical journals of the Urals and Siberia in the last decade is characterized by conceptual and methodological pluralism, diversity, mosaic and fragmentary research topics, and "narrow specialization" of their authors. At the same time, there is a deepening of scientific ideas, the introduction of new sources into scientific circulation, and the sharpness of the authors ' worldview preferences is reduced, which indicates that there are potential opportunities for further expansion of the "General historiographic space" of the Civil war.

The monograph is a doctor of historical sciences, a leading researcher at the Institute of the History of Natural Science and Technology. S.I. Vavilova RAN Olga Alexandrovna Valkova «Sturmuya science stronghold: women scientists of the Russian Empire» reviewed and analyzed the history of the scientific activities of women in the Russian Empire from the end of the 18th century to the beginning of the 20th century, inclusive. The book examines the process of the gradual integration of women into the sphere of professional scientific activity, which has been slowly going on in Russia since the end of the 18th century and throughout the 19th century, which has captured an increasing number of participants over time; studied the forms and types that took in this chronological period, the scientific work of women; legislative acts influencing it and regulating it; ways of interaction between women - science lovers with the professional scientific community and gradually developing stable paradigms of such interaction; the attitude of wide layers of the «educated society» to women scientists and their activities. The monograph is based on a wide range of historical sources, primarily archival, first introduced into scientific circulation. In addition, the author identified and used in the book a unique, completely previously unknown statistical material characterizing Russian women who were engaged in natural sciences in the second half of the 19th and early 20th centuries. The book is addressed to a wide circle of readers interested in the social history of science in Russia, the gender history of science, and the scientific and biographical genre.

On 26 February 1921, the Soviet Union signed a «Treaty of Friendship» with Iran which was to pave the way for future relations between the two states. Although the Russians renounced various commercial and territorial concessions which the Tsarist government had exacted from Iran, they secured the insertion of two articles which prohibited the formation or residence in either country of individuals, groups, military forces which were hostile to the other party, and gave the Soviet Union the right to send forces into Iran in the event that a third party should attempt to carry out a policy of usurpation there, use Iran as a base for operations against Russia, or otherwise threaten Soviet frontiers. Furthermore, in 1927, the Soviet Union signed a «Treaty of Guarantee and Neutrality» with Iran which required the contracting parties to refrain from aggression against each other and not to join blocs or alliances directed against each other’s sovereignty. However, the treaty was violated by the Soviet Union’s wartime occupation of Iran, together with Britain and the United States. The violation was subsequently condoned by the conclusion of the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance of 29 January 1942, which permitted the Soviet Union to maintain troops in Iran for a limited period. Requiring restraint from propaganda, subversion and hostile political groups, the treaty would also appear to have been persistently violated by the Soviet Union: for example, the various radio campaigns of «Radio Moscow» and the «National Voice of Iran»; the financing and control of the Tudeh party; and espionage and rumour-mongering by Soviet officials in Iran. Whatever the Soviet’s original conception of this treaty may have been, they had since used it one-sidedly as a treaty in which both countries would be neutral, with one being «more neutral than the other». In effect, both the 1921 and 1927 treaties had been used as «a stick to beat the Iranians» whenever it suited the Soviets to do so, in propaganda and in inter-governmental dealings. During the Second World War, the treaty between the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and Iran, dated 29 January 1942 - and concluded some 5 months after the occupation of parts of Iran by allied forces, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union were entitled to maintain troops in Iran, but the presence of such troops was not to constitute a military occupation. Nonetheless, Soviet forces in the Northern provinces used their authority to prevent both the entry of officials of the Iranian Government and the export of agricultural products to other provinces. The treaty also required military forces to be withdrawn not later than six months after «all hostilities between the Allied Powers and Germany and her associates have been suspended by the conclusion of an armistice or on the conclusion of peace, whichever is the earlier». This entailed that the Soviet Union should have withdrawn its forces by March 1946, six months after the defeat of Japan. Meanwhile, however, there emerged in Iranian Azerbaijan, under Soviet tutelage, a movement for advanced provincial autonomy which developed into a separatist movement under a Communist-led «National Government of Azerbaijan». In 1945, Soviet forces prevented the Iranian army from moving troops into Azerbaijan, and also confined the Iranian garrison to barracks while the dissidents took forcible possession of key points. At the same time, Soviet troops prevented the entry of Iranian troops into the Kurdistan area, where, under Soviet protection, a Kurdish Republic had been set up by Qazi Mohammad. In 1946, after Iran had appealed to the Security Council, the Russians secured from the Iranian Prime Minister, Qavam es Saltaneh, a promise to introduce a bill providing for the formation of a Soviet-Iranian Oil Company to exploit the Northern oil reserves. In return, the Soviet Union agreed to negotiate over Azerbaijan: the Iranians thereupon withdrew their complaint to the Security Council, and Soviet forces left Azerbaijan by 9 May 1946. In 1955, when Iran was considering joining a regional defensive pact, which was later to manifest itself as the Baghdad Pact, the Soviet Government threatened that such a move would oblige the Soviet Union to act in accordance with Article 6 of the 1921 treaty. This was the «big stick» aspect of Soviet attempts to waylay Iranian membership of such a pact; the «carrot» being the conclusion in 1955 of a Soviet-Iranian «Financial and Frontier Agreement» by which the Soviets agreed to a mutually beneficial re-alignment of the frontier and to pay debts arising from their wartime occupation of Northern Iran. The Soviets continued their war of nerves against Iranian accession to the Pact by breaking off trade negotiations in October 1955 and by a series of minor affronts, such as the cancellation of cultural visits and minimal attendance at the Iranian National Day celebrations in Moscow. In a memorandum dated November 26, the Iranian Government openly rejected Soviet criticisms. Soviet displeasure was expressed officially, in the press and to private individuals. In the ensuing period, Soviet and Soviet-controlled radio stations continued to bombard their listeners with criticism of the Baghdad Pact, or CENTO as it later became. In early 1959, with the breakdown of the negotiations for a non-aggression pact, Iran-Soviet relations entered into a phase of propaganda warfare which intensified with the signature of the bilateral military agreement between Iran and the United States. The Soviet Union insisted that Iran should not permit the establishment of foreign military bases on its soil, and continued to threaten Iran despite the Shah’s assurance on this issue. Consequently, the Iranians denounced Articles 5 and 6 of the 1921 treaty, on the basis of which the Soviet Union was making its demands. Attempts by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to improve relations met with little success until September 1959, when Russia offered massive economic support on condition that Iran renounced its military agreements with the United States. This offer was rejected, and, as relations continued to become strained, the Soviets changed their demand to one neither for a written agreement that Iran would not allow its terrain to be used as a base of aggression nor for the establishment of foreign missile bases. The publication by the Soviet Union of the so-called «CENTO documents» did nothing to relieve the strain: the Soviet Union continued to stand out for a bilateral agreement with Iran, and the Shah, in consultation with Britain and the United States, continued to offer no more than a unilateral assurance. In July 1962, with a policy of endeavouring once more to improve relations, the Shah maintained his insistence on a unilateral statement, and the Soviet Government finally agreed to this. The Iranian undertaking was accordingly given and acknowledged on 15 September. The Instruments of ratification of the 1957 Agreements on Transit and Frontier Demarcation were exchanged in Moscow on 26 October 1962 and in Tehran on 20 December, respectively.

The article provides a comparative analysis of the situation of national minorities in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia at the beginning of the XXI century. The relevance of the research topic is due to ensuring the rights of representatives of national minorities from the moment the South Caucasus countries joined the Council of Europe. Membership in the Council of Europe contributes to the protection of human rights, the development of democracy and cultural identity, the resolution of problems faced by the European community, such as discrimination against minorities, hatred of foreigners (xenophobia), intolerance, etc. The aim of the study is to analyze the state of national minorities of the three republics in the implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. The study was carried out using the articles of Armenian (G. Asatryan, V. Arakelov, M. Agadzhanyan), Georgian (G. Svanidze) and Azerbaijani (G. Orudzhev) researchers, regulatory documents, statistical sources and reports of the Council of Europe.